This paper uses a specific-factors model incorporating two sectors, in order to explore the efficiency and distributional consequences of international disintegration of production. The economy faces a neighboring region where the wage rate is lower than obtaining in the domestic economy under integrated production, which gives rise to an incentive for outsourcing. Assuming that outsourcing is takes place in only one of the two sectors, we show that under perfect markets it gives rise to an "outsourcing surplus" which is analogous to the "immigration surplus". However, in contrast to the case of immigration, the gain from outsourcing is the larger, the smaller the associated redistribution to the disadvantage of labor. However, if the activity which is lost to outsourcing involves a fixed input, then outsourcing may cause a welfare loss and the domestic wage rate may fall below the foreign level. The paper identifies conditions that lead to this outcome. The case is analyzed as a two-stage game where firms decide on the outsourcing strategy in stage one, and then behave competitively in their respective labor markets in stage two.
Introduction
Governments often feel under pressure to become active in order to ease domestic adjustment to economic globalization. Any well-guided policy of adjustment, however, requires a precise meaning of globalization. Following Peter Temin (1999) , I submit that a defining feature of economic globalization is the world-wide dominance of arbitrage on markets for goods, factors, and financial assets. Arbitrage implies a tendency to equalize prices of goods and factors, as well as (risk-adjusted) returns on assets across national boundaries.
Temin points out that economic globalization, defined in this way, was characteristic already of the late 19th century, albeit without appearance of the term "globalization".
It has therefore become common to refer to the late 20th century as the beginning of a second wave of economic globalization.
Is there anything special about the second wave? According to the traditional view of international economics, there are three principal channels through which internationalization takes place: international exchange of goods and services, international migration, and international mobility of financial assets and savings. There is widespread consensus that in all of these dimensions the first wave of economic globalization was no less pronounced than the second. 1 In this paper, the focus lies on goods and factor markets.
Although we observe an ever higher degree of integration of goods markets, labor markets are still quite national, because of either natural barriers to migration or migration policies; see for instance Faini (1999) . Indeed, there is evidence suggesting that labor mobility is lower today than in the first wave of globalization; see Baldwin & Martin (1999) .
What, then, is the distinctive feature of the second wave of economic globalization that would warrant the degree of apprehension observed today? A possible answer is new vehicles of internationalization regarding commodity and factor markets. The traditional view of internationalization rests on a clear distinction between produced commodities and primary factors. The principle of international arbitrage, according to this view, operates on goods prices directly via international exchange of goods, based on a given and well defined underlying value-added process. In addition, it operates on factor prices -directly via international factor movements, and indirectly via the factor price effects of trade. However, recent developments appear to challenge this view. Improvements in communications technology as well as reductions of formal and technical barriers to trade allow the principle of international arbitrage to cut into ever smaller slices of what was formerly perceived as a coherent value-added process. 2 This blurs the distinction between commodity markets and trade on the one hand, and factor movements on the other. What we observe, then, is an international fragmentation of value-added processes which were hitherto carried out in an integrated way within certain countries. The phenomenon is also described as outsourcing, whereby single components of a value-added process are shifted to foreign sources where they can be carried out at lower cost. 3 According to this view, international outsourcing or fragmentation is not just a matter of international trade in established markets for intermediate goods. The defining feature is that firms in one country are able to directly rely on factor foreign markets, with factor prices different from what they face domestically, for part of their value-added chain. In contrast to traditional trade theory, the value-added process then does not take place under a uniform set of factor prices but draws on different factor markets for different fragments.
There is a sizable body of literature demonstrating the empirical significance of this phenomenon in the recent episode of economic globalization. 4 Taking the empirical importance of international fragmentation for granted, what are the challenges for theory and economic policy? In an early paper, Jones & Kierzkowski (1990) have pointed out that international fragmentation should be beneficial in that it enhances the gains from trade. Krugman (1995) strikes a somewhat less optimistic tone, arguing that it may contribute to the decline of wages for low-skilled labor in industrialized countries. This claim has been further substantiated, both theoretically and empirically, by Feenstra & Hanson (1996 . However, there is no clear-cut theoretical result supporting the view 2 See Jones & Kierzkowski (1990) and Harris (1995) . 3 It is worth pointing out here, that outsourcing may, partly at least, explain the aforementioned low degree of international mobility of labor in the present wave of globalization, in that it increases the scope for production to move where labor is abundant and cheap, thus rendering unnecessary some of the migration flows that might otherwise arise.
that international fragmentation will generally harm low-skilled labor in industrial countries, in absolute terms or relative to high-skilled labor. Thus, Arndt (1997 Arndt ( ,1999 argues that labor may benefit, relative to capital, from outsourcing in the US-Mexican context, while papers by Venables (1999) , Deardorff (2001a Deardorff ( ,2001b , and Jones & Kierzkowski (2001a ,2001b point to a multiplicity of possible factor price effects from fragmentation.
In Kohler (2002) , I have made an effort to derive general results identifying the common forces at work in all of these cases.
From a policy point of view, this literature suffers from two shortcomings. First, it is often quite abstract and seemingly remote from the immediate policy problem. And second, it is biased towards distributional concerns, while policy should arguably be based on a well-balanced consideration of both, distribution and efficiency (or welfare) aspects.
For the policy maker, international fragmentation sometimes arises in a pretty fearsome way in that certain regions all of a sudden face the spectre of losing whole components of value-added chains in certain industries which are perceived as cornerstones of their economies. There will often be a temptation on the part of policy makers to "do something about it", particularly with respect to local labor markets. But what are the relevant questions to ask? What are the criteria that policy makers should employ? This paper attempts to provide a framework of analysis to deal with these issues.
While it is true that distributional concerns can always justify an activist policy stance, there are reasons to be cautious. The principal thrust of the above-mentioned literature is that distributional effects of outsourcing can sometimes be quite counter-intuitive, hence swift policy action carries a danger of being mislead. But even if distributional effects are safely established, we need a framework of analysis which allows us to juxtapose the efficiency (or welfare) aspects and the distributional aspects of international fragmentation. Policy makers are likely to reduce the efficiency aspect to the question of job losses.
Of course, if labor that is released due to outsourcing were to remain permanently unemployed, then there would be a clear efficiency case for a defensive policy stance, trying in one way or another to prevent or restrict outsourcing. But, on a fundamental level, whether or not unemployment caused by outsourcing will be permanent is not exogenous to policy. It depends on labor market institutions which are importantly shaped by policy, hence policy should not simply equate jobs lost to outsourcing with a rise in unemployment. Generally, from an efficiency point of view the relevant question to ask is whether, under the given labor market institutions, alternative employment of the resources set free through outsourcing generates value-added which fully compensates for the value-added that is lost to outsourcing, such that the economy (or region) as a whole gains.
This paper looks into this question using the well-known specific factors model pioneered by Jones (1971) . That model is well established as a powerful work-horse to address distributional issues. As will become apparent below, it proves a very valuable tool also for the aforementioned efficiency question, while retaining its distributional insights. It is, thus, a convenient framework of analysis which should be helpful in formulating a well-guided policy towards outsourcing.
I try to make the analysis as simple as possible, given the purpose outlined above.
I assume only two sectors, each of which produces a tradable final good, using mobile labor and a specific factor, called capital. Moreover, I assume that underlying features of technology allow international fragmentation to take place in only one of these sectors, and that the value-added process involves only two fragments. Outsourcing is explained as a simple attempt to exploit a lower foreign wage rate, and it is assumed, a priori, to take place as a foreign direct investment activity, as opposed to relying on arms-length transactions.
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Within these confines, I will show that if outsourcing takes place without any element of indivisibility (or non-convexity) in production, then it causes an efficiency gain which is perfectly analogous to the so-called immigration surplus of inward migration. However, contrary to immigration, and in contrast with a widespread view on globalization, with outsourcing there is no positive relationship between the magnitude of that gain and the amount of pain that comes in the form of potentially troublesome income distribution.
Instead, the more moderate the redistribution, the larger the gain. I will then show that even under a well-functioning labor market bar of any rigidities, outsourcing may cause an efficiency loss, if technology features a specific form of non-convexity. The non-convexity considered is one where the specific capital used in the disintegrated component of valueadded is a fixed input. I shall identify the crucial conditions responsible for whether or not the negative welfare result obtains. Among the surprising results, we find that these conditions are more likely to be met if the wage gap between the domestic and the foreign economy is small. This is in contrast to the often held view according to 5 In-depth treatments of these issues, combining general equilibrium and the theory of the firm are found in two recent papers by Grossman & Helpman (2002a ,2002b .
which outsourcing poses a particular threat if this gap is large. However, the smaller this gap, the more likely will outsourcing cause the domestic wage rate to even fall below the foreign wage rate. I shall explore the role that the number of firms plays in this context by portraying outsourcing as a two-stage game, whereby firms decide on where to locate their capital stock in stage one, and then choose an optimal labor input in stage two. Finally, I shall consider the welfare implications of outsourcing if there is monopsony power on the domestic labor market, which may or may not be related to non-convexities in production. For reasons of space, I will not deal with the question of optimal policies to deal with these welfare implications.
A basic model of international fragmentation
The approach that I choose runs as follows. The principal possibility of international fragmentation is captured by a suitable description of technology, assuming that production may be disintegrated in sector 1, while it is always fully integrated in sector 2. I start out by looking at an equilibrium for a single economy (region) facing given final goods prices, where international fragmentation -although possible in principle -does not arise. The small country assumption allows me to restrict attention to the production side. I then invoke a nearby country with a lower wage rate for an effective unit of labor, assuming that due to some exogenous reduction in the cost of international fragmentation firms face an incentive to engage in international fragmentation, exploiting the lower foreign wage rate by carrying out one of the two fragments of value-added abroad. This gives rise to a new domestic equilibrium, the details of which depend on the precise circumstances under which such outsourcing takes place. I address these details and then investigate the welfare and distributional aspects of international fragmentation by means of a comparative static analysis of the two equilibria.
International fragmentation is easier in some sectors than in others. I therefore assume that production is amenable to locational disintegration in sector 1, while sector 2 stands for the rest of the economy where production is always fully integrated and outsourcing therefore cannot arise. 6 Indicating the two sectors by superscript indices 1 and 2, and the two fragments of value-added by subscripts A and B, final outputs Y 1 and Y 2 satisfies the following two production functions and a full employment constraint:
Throughout the analysis, total labor endowment is given atL and assumed to be fully employed. All capital stocksK are given and sector-specific. For industry 1, they are also specific to the two fragments which are modeled by separable sub-production functions
respectively. To start with, I assume that all production functions are concave and there is perfect competition on goods and labor markets. Alternative technologies incorporating non-convexities and elements of imperfect competition will be considered in later stages. I assume a given number of domestic firms in both sectors that face given world prices for the two final goods. For ease of notation, I assume the relative price of the two goods to be equal to 1.
Using w to denote the domestic wage rate, the first-order conditions for profit maximization are:
Y 1 j denotes the marginal productivity of fragment j in sector 1, and F 1 jL denotes the marginal productivity of labor in generating fragment j of industry 1. As disintegration of production in sector 2 is ruled out by assumption, Y 2 L denotes the marginal productivity of labor in industry 2. The two conditions 4 can be solved to yield two labor demand
. Adding the corresponding labor demand curve for industry 2 from condition 5, V 2 (w,K 2 ), we obtain the equilibrium wage rate w * from
I shall henceforth write
for overall labor demand by industry 1 under integrated production. Integrated production means that a single wage rate is relevant for production of both fragments. Inserting w * back into the first order conditions, we obtain equilibrium employment levels
The situation is depicted in the usual way by figure 1. Separability of production in sector 1, which will subsequently be responsible for international fragmentation, can be brought to the fore by drawing V for neutral productivity gaps, the shadow price is the same everywhere, and a relative price deviating from the shadow price can arise only due to distortions. I shall not, however, pursue this line of analysis in the present paper. I argue, instead, that a satisfactory theory of international fragmentation should take recourse directly to international factor price differences as a driving force towards international disintegration of production. We therefore focus on a case where the two fragments are not traded to start with. Rather than assuming that the two fragments are available via international trade at some price different from the shadow price F 1 BL /F 1 AL , we look at a case where domestic firms start out from integrated production in sector 1 and now obtain access to foreign labor at a wage rate lower than w * for part of their value-added chain. The defining feature of disintegration is that different sets of factor prices become relevant for different fragments of the value-added chain. And the purpose is to explore the welfare and distributional consequences in a unified modeling framework.
With specific factors, there is no international equalization of factor prices even with free trade. Thus, if labor is immobile across countries, w * will generally be different from wages abroad. Suppose, therefore, that w E is the wage rate for an effective unit of labor in some neighboring country, comparable to domestic labor employed in industry 1 under integrated production. An effective unit of foreign labor may require more than one natural unit for two reasons: there may be costs of disintegrating production across borders, and there may be a pure efficiency difference between the two regions. 7 We assume that, due to technological improvements (either reducing the costs of disintegration or increasing the level of foreign efficiency) w E now falls below w * . This is our simple "globalization scenario". 8 Throughout this paper, I assume that w E is not affected by outsourcing as such.
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To proceed with the analysis, we need to be more specific about locational disintegration of production. I assume that fragment B of the value-added process in sector 1 may be carried out abroad, while fragment A, which may be interpreted as the final stage, needs to take place domestically. This might seem a bit ad hoc, but it is a reasonable way to capture the fact that industrial production is typically featured by a hierarchy of stages. Ruling out the reverse form of international fragmentation^, whereby the final stage is moved abroad and fragment B is produced domestically, is best interpreted as a non-specified locational advantage of the domestic economy pertaining to the final stage A. This, of course, still leaves open whether outsourcing of fragment B, if taking place at all, will be done relying on arms-length transactions with foreign subcontractors, or via foreign direct investment (FDI). The term outsourcing seems to suggest, and indeed is often defined in such a way, that internal provision of some service is replaced by market purchases. This paper, however, uses a different definition, where a crucial point is the ability to directly draw on some foreign labor market for part of one's value-added process 7 See also Kohler (2001) . This assumes that costs of disintegration act like iceberg-cost on labor alone, and that technological differences are of a Harrod-neutral form. These are restrictions, of course, but they seem warranted by the simplicity of exposition gained at this stage. 8 I ignore artifical, or formal, barrier to trade which may similarly be responsible for an outsourcingincentive to arise. A scenario with special relevance is one where in an environment of preferential trade agreements rules of origin may be applied with more general cumulation. This will, for instance, be the case for eastern European countries once they become members of the EU.
by locating fragment B abroad. Foreign, rather than domestic, procurement is the issue.
And this may, in principle, be done with arms length transactions, or with FDI. However,
I assume in what follows that some internalization advantage leads domestic firms to rely on FDI, rather than arms-length transactions. To keep matters simple, I assume that the total stock of capital invested at home and abroad is equal toK 1 B . In figure 1 , if production of both fragments F 1 A and F 1 B were kept at their original levels, then international fragmentation could be described as
A BDC accruing to domestic capital owners. This does not, however, tell us much about the welfare effect, because it could be a mere re-distribution from labor to capital income. To know more about the welfare and distribution effects of such outsourcing, we must look at the full new equilibrium that will emerge with w E < w * , given the possibility of locating production of fragment B abroad. It will become clear immediately that with a flexible domestic wage rate, total production levels of the two fragments (domestic and foreign) will not remain unchanged. Indeed, the precise nature of quantity adjustments to disintegration of fragment B, and the associated reallocation of domestic labor, importantly drives the overall efficiency effect which will not be positive under all conceivable circumstances.
3 "Outsourcing-surplus" from fragmentation A ) × w * , and outsourcing would cause a net welfare loss. However, this is a highly questionable assumption. This paper looks at the more interesting case where labor is re-employed elsewhere. In this case the crucial question is whether alternative employment generates value-added equal to, or lower than (
In the latter case the welfare effect is lower than the immediate cost-savings effect CB 1 A BD. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out, even with full employment, that the alternative valueadded is too low for outsourcing to be beneficial. To see if it is we need to solve for the new "cum-fragmentation-equilibrium". The subsequent analysis will show that a positive welfare effect arises if a) there are no market imperfections, and b) outsourcing is a "continuous" process and not subject to any indivisibility. I first look at this "benign" case, and then turn to the case where a specific form of non-convexity in production gives rise to "discontinuous outsourcing" and an associated potential for a welfare loss.
To be more precise, by no indivisibility I mean that there is no fixed cost, either in production as such, or in linking fragments produced in different locations (costs of international fragmentation). This is the case set out by the above assumptions. The "cum-fragmentation-equilibrium" is described by
The first three equations are the first order conditions, taking into account that fragment B can now be obtained from abroad where the wage rate is w E , while all other employment takes place at the domestic wage rate w. Equation 10 determines how much foreign employment will take place to generate the profit-maximizing amount of fragment B in industry 1. We denote this by L 1 Bf , and it is determined as a residual between what is left from domestic labor endowment and profit maximizing employment in industry 2 and fragment A of industry 1. Equation 11 states that the domestic wage cannot be lower than w E . This is ruled out by the fact that firms would then face an incentive to shift, marginally, from foreign to domestic procurement of fragment B. 10 The final line 12 simply states that foreign employment in fragment-B-production cannot be negative, A formal comparative static analysis of this equilibrium is complicated by the inequality conditions. But the result is easily depicted by figure 1 where equilibrium values are denoted by a tilde. The figure assumes thatw = w E ; a case wherew > w E is easily imagined. 11 Notice that the horizontal distanceB 1 AB 2 measures domestic employment in fragment B, whileB 1 AB measures total (domestic and foreign) employmentL 1 B in fragment-B-production in industry 1. It is now easy to see that outsourcing generates a domestic redistribution of income from labor to capital. The income loss to domestic labor is equal to (w * −w) ×L, all of which ends up as additional income to domestic capital.
In addition, domestic capital owners gain on infra-marginal units of re-allocated domestic labor, and on foreign labor. This gain is measured by the shaded triangles in figure 1 which, in their entirety, represent a positive net welfare effect to the domestic economy.
The labor initially set free through outsourcing, once reallocated towards alternative domestic use, generates value-added equal to B This analysis is reminiscent of the well-known immigration surplus. Borjas (1999) shows for a single-output world with two factors (skilled vs. unskilled labor) that if the skill-mix of immigration is different from that of domestic labor, and if technology is convex and wages adjust in line with the marginal product of labor, then the labor inflow is employed along a downward-sloping marginal product curve, and domestic factor owners enjoy a benefit from infra-marginal units of foreign labor employed. For HeckscherOhlin models with mobile factors, employment of the factor inflow may well be employed with unchanged marginal productivities if there is sufficient room for Rybczynski-type 11 There is a subtle difference between this case and the case depticed in figure 1, however. The V 1 Aschedule in figure 1 holds for a uniform wage rate in both fragments. If fragment B is produced abroad with a lower wage rate w E , then labor demand for fragment A follows a different schedule; see also figure 2 below.
12 Note that the distanceL
factor reallocation among sectors with differing factor intensities, in which case there is no surplus for domestic factor owners. In a single-output model, as in Borjas (1999) , the diminishing marginal productivity of the factor inflow arises if its composition is different from the pre-existing endowment. 13 In the present case it arises because there are specific factors. The movement along a downward-sloping marginal productivity curve corresponding to the immigration-surplus-case is the movement from B toB and from B toB 2 , respectively.
There is an important difference, however, between the immigration surplus and the welfare gain from outsourcing. While the immigration surplus approaches zero if the domestic labor demand schedule becomes flat, as in the case of Rybczynski-type domestic reallocation, the outsourcing surplus arising here is the larger, the larger the elasticities of labor demand in the alternative domestic employment of labor. This is readily seen from figure 1, where the shaded triangles increase in size if the slopes of V 1 A and V 2 fall in absolute value. The difference is easily explained. The immigration surplus as usually portrayed assumes an exogenously given labor inflow, with wages adjusting endogenously.
Here, we assume an exogenous wage differential to start with, w * − w E , and the quantity adjustments (extent of outsourcing as well as domestic labor re-allocation) follow endogenously.
Putting the results obtained up to this point a broader perspective, we identify an important message. It is often argued that, while globalization may hold significant efficiency gains, such gains are typically associated with painful redistribution, and the larger the gains, the larger the pains. 14 Somewhat surprisingly, in the present context, outsourcing is a form of globalization where this tension does not arise. Indeed, it is evident from figure 1 that the larger the gain from international outsourcing , the lower the redistribution effect in the form of lower wage income. Moreover, it is easy to recognize without 13 Compare this to the general result on distributional effects from fragmentation derived in Kohler (2002) , where the factor intensity pattern of outsourcing relative to the domestic endowment similarly plays a key role. 14 See Rodrik (1998) who emphasizes that gains from trade require restructuring and that restructuring is likely to have distributional impacts. Moreover, he argues that "... if the distributional impacts have been small, the net gains have been small in all likelihood as well". In Rodrik (1997) , he reports on estimates indicating that 5$ of income get redistributed for every 1$ of net welfare gains from trade.
any further analysis that the analysis generalizes beyond the dimensional confines of this model. As long as there are sector specific factors and labor is mobile across industries and fragments, international fragmentation will be to the disadvantage of domestic labor, but will entail a welfare gain for the economy as a whole. And the more elastic labor demand in those activities remaining domestic (in our case fragment A and the "non-outsourcing" sector 2), the larger the welfare gain, and the lower the redistribution effect.
4 Indivisibility and "discontinuous outsourcing"
In the case depicted by figure 1 domestic firms undertake production of fragment B in two different locations, domestically and abroad. This contrasts with recent experience of outsourcing whereby certain regions lose whole components of value-added-processes to foreign regions. Indeed, this element of "discontinuity" may partly be responsible for the great deal of apprehension that we sometimes observe about international fragmentation.
Discontinuous behavior usually results from some form of non-convexity in technology.
Suppose, therefore, that the capital stock used for fragment B in industry 1 is not only specific to that fragment, but also a fixed input. In other words, the marginal productivity of labor in F 1 B falls to zero if the stock of capital falls below some critical level. This is a convenient way to explore "discontinuous outsourcing" within the present model setup.
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With this technology, there is a clear incentive on the firm-level to avoid simultaneous production of fragment B at home and abroad, as this would involve costly duplication of fixed investment. Whether or not we observe "discontinuous outsourcing" on the aggregate level depends on how firms interact.
On a fundamental level, if non-convexity is an important element of technology, perfect competition as assumed up to now becomes questionable. Specifically, with this modification of technology one may question price-taking behavior of firms on world commodity 15 In Kohler (2001) , I look at a case where the cost that firms incur when they engage in international fragmentation of a value-added process incorporates a fixed-cost element. However, this does not, as such, constitute an incentive to close down domestic production of individual fragments altogether. Indeed, a result in that paper is that firms will typically retain some domestic production of a fragment that they produce offshore, provided that such offshore production can take place via foreign direct investment, as assumed here. markets. However, if the fixed cost involved in fragment B is not "too large", relative to overall cost and world demand, a free entry equilibrium of the world market may feature a sufficiently large number of firms world-wide for each of them to perceive a given world price for its final output. We assume that this is the case. Suppose, then, that there are n domestic firms in industry 1. We assume that n remains constant throughout our outsourcing scenarios. For the time being, we also assume that industry 1 firms firms have no power on the domestic labor market where they compete with industry 2 for mobile labor. I shall return to the issue of market power in a subsequent section.
As before, we view point B in figure 1 as the initial equilibrium where each of the n firms in industry 1 chooses its profit maximizing level of employment under integrated production, given the aforementioned critical level of fragment B capital stock. Adding these capital stocks up over all firms givesK 1 B . In other words, assuming complete symmetry across firms, the fixed capital stock on the firm level isK 1 B /n. By complete analogy to the above analysis, we now assume that, due to some technological advance in transport and communications or to lower formal barriers, each of these domestic firms faces an incentive to move production of fragment B abroad where the wage rate for an efficiency unit of labor is w E < w * . Keeping the number of firms and the overall capital stock constant, moving fragment B abroad implies that a firm invests the capital stockK 1 B /n abroad rather than domestically.
Potential welfare loss: the single firm case
We first look at the easiest case where n = 1, starting out with an appropriate reinterpretation of figure 1. Thus, suppose employment in fragment A is atB 1 A while, due to the underlying indivisibility, all of fragment B is produced abroad, with a profit maximizing foreign labor input equal to the distanceB 1 AB . Since industry 2 is at pointB 2 , there is excess supply on the domestic labor market equal toB 1 AB 2 . This exerts a downward pressure on the domestic wage rate. It is important to note that, as the wage rate falls further, domestic fragment-B-employment will not follow line V 1 A , since this is only valid for integrated production, i.e., under the condition that both types of employment are governed by a common wage rate; see equation 4 above. Due to outsourcing, fragment-B-employment is now governed by a constant wage rate w E different from w. Notice also that a domestic wage rate falling below w E does not constitute an incentive for the domestic firm to withdraw, or abstain, from international fragmentation, since investing its fragment-B-capital stock at home would immediately move the economy back to B,
where industry-1-profits are clearly lower.
In the case where
<L the domestic labor market equilibrium is determined as follows. In equations 7 and 8, the foreign wage rate w E becomes an important determinant of industry 1 labor demand. These equations can be solved for demand functionsṼ
B is assumed to be equal to the above mentioned critical level.Ṽ 1 A gives profit-maximizing labor demand in fragment A which, by assumption, needs to take place domestically, whileṼ 1 B gives profit-maximizing employment in fragment B which in this case is is produced abroad at a wage rate equal to w E .Ṽ 1 A might be called a "cum-outsourcing" labor demand curve for fragment A.
For any w < w E , if we compareṼ
, the integrated case where fragment B is produced by drawing on domestic labor with a wage equal to w (derived from solving equations 4 above), we haveṼ figure 2 reveals that this scenario may involve an overall welfare loss for the home economy. The reason is that there is triangular loss, in addition to the positive welfare triangles familiar from figure 1 above. Domestic labor reallocated from former fragment-B-employment to fragment A and industry 2, respectively, generates less value-added than it did before. Prior to its reallocation, this labor has received income equal to the rectangle
The difference is not completely offset by the immediate cost-savings effect B the additional capital income generated on infra-marginal labor now employed in industry 2 and fragment A, respectively, which is equal to BẼ
A is smaller in size than the double-triangular gain identified in the simpler case above, will international fragmentation give rise to a positive "outsourcing-surplus".
A negative "outsourcing-surplus" arises only ifw < w E . It is quite illustrative to look at a necessary condition for this to arise. Suppose η 1 A is the elasticity of V
1
A with respect to w, and η 2 is the elasticity of V 2 . Moreover, define ω = w E /w * − 1 as the percentage wage gap between the domestic wage rate and the effective foreign wage rate that forms the basis for international fragmentation. Then, the condition under which international fragmentation leads to a wage ratew < w E may be approximated by
where a star indicates employment levels in the initial equilibrium. 16 The left-hand side gives the additional employment arising in fragment A of industry 1 and industry 2 if the domestic wage rate falls down to w E . If this is smaller than the employment lost due to outsourcing, then domestic labor market equilibrium requiresw < w E .
Notice that by construction of our argument ω < 0. Assuming normal labor demand schedules as in our figures, η 1 A and η 2 are also negative. Condition 13 may be rewritten
stating that the wage gap must be small in absolute value, relative to the weighted sum of labor demand elasticities in the remaining domestic activities, whereby each of these elasticities receives a "weight" equal to the size of its employment relative to the employment lost to outsourcing. It is obvious that condition 14 generalizes to cases where there are more then two industries, and also to cases where there is more than 1 fragment that moves "offshore". Another way to look at this condition which may shed more light on the issue is to introduce proper weights λ
A , so that the condition 14 appears as
A general interpretation of condition 15 runs as follows. International fragmentation will always involve a separation of activities which are moved abroad from those which remain domestic. The left-hand side of condition 15 measures the cost-effect of the wage gap if applied to the initial levels of those activities which for some reason are ruled out from outsourcing ("non-outsourcing activities"), relative to the initial wage cost of the fragment which will eventually be lost to outsourcing. The right-hand side is simply the inverse of the weighted sum, in absolute terms, of labor demand elasticities of the "non-outsourcing activities".
There is an important general lesson from this analysis. Policy discussions often concentrate on the wage difference w * − w E as a measure of the "threat" that globalization may pose to "high-wage-countries". This view is in marked contrast to the general conclusion to be drawn from this analysis. A welfare loss for the domestic economy (negative "outsourcing-surplus") is the more likely, the smaller this gap. Nor is the redistribution effect determined by this gap, as is most easily recognized by simply altering the level of figure 2 . More generally, the larger the wage gap, the larger the gains from outsourcing and the lower the loss from "discontinuity", given the size of the disintegrated fragment (measured by the amount of initial employment L 1 * B ) and given the elasticities of labor demand in those production activities that remain in the domestic economy. The less elastic these labor demands, the more severe the domestic wage effect of outsourcing, w − w * .
17

Multiple firms: the non-cooperative equilibrium
Suppose n, the number of domestic firms in industry 1 exceeds 1. We must now distinguish between two cases separated by a critical value of n. Intuitively, if n is sufficiently large, then, as far as our outsourcing scenario is concerned, the non-convexity existing on the firm-level may be annihilated in the aggregate. More precisely, there may be an equilibrium separating firms that remain at home with fragment B from those choosing an outsourcing strategy. Such an equilibrium essentially approaches the "benign" case 17 A similar thrust is also emerging from the general analysis of distributional effects in Kohler (2002) ,
where it is shown that the factor price effects are importantly driven by the production characteristics of the domestic "non-outsourcing" activities.
with a convex technology and partial outsourcing depicted in figure 1. Whether or not such an equilibrium arises depends on the fundamental parameters of the economy. This could be brought to the fore by a more extensive model, dealing explicitly with demand and the emerging market structure in sector 1, ultimately endogenizing n. However, even without further modeling it is clear that, other things equal, such a case is more likely a)
if the wage gap w * − w E is large, b) if labor demand elasticities of the domestic activities figure 2 describe aggregate demand in industry 1. They are drawn in linear fashion for ease of drawing, but assume that they exhibit constant elasticities. Then, assuming symmetric firms, a "benign" equilibrium is ruled out ifL
This condition states that employment by domestic "non-outsourcing" activities at a domestic wage rate equal to w E does not leave enough labor from endowmentL, in order to meet the profit maximizing fragment-B labor demand by a single representative domestic firm. In other words, even a single firm maintaining domestic production of fragment B would increase the domestic wage rate above w E . It could, therefore, increase its profit by means of outsourcing. Thus, all firms obtain fragment B from "offshore", and the resulting equilibrium is fully described by figure 2. The case is equivalent to one where n = 1.
If n = 1, this condition (which rules out a "benign" equilibrium) is clearly satisfied. For a given n > 1, it is more likely to be satisfied with high labor demand elasticities, and with high employment shares of the "non-outsourcing" activities, and of course with a high wage gap ω.
The remaining question then is whether any case where n is large enough to violate condition 17 will automatically lead us back to the "benign" case of figure 1. The answer 18 In figure 2, this implies thatL 1 Bf /n is larger than the distanceB
is "a qualified yes", provided each firm perceives a given domestic wage rate, irrespective of its own location of fragment B. In this case, whenever the domestic wage rate is below w E , each firm presently pursuing an outsourcing strategy faces an incentive to revert to integrated domestic production. In doing so, it will bid up the domestic wage rate, and one can envisage an adjustment process whereby the domestic wage rate comes close to w E , such that the next firm reverting its strategy drives up the domestic wage rate beyond w E . As a result, the incentive for outsourcing reappears. However, any firm following this incentive will again drive down the domestic wage rate below w E . Except for a knife-edge case, an adjustment process where firms ignore the wage effects of changing from integrated production to outsourcing, or vice versa, will lead to an "equilibrium" characterized by oscillations of the domestic wage rate around w E . Indeed, if all domestic firms are entirely symmetric, then oscillation will be between w * andw in figure 2 above.
However, this is an unconvincing story, for two quite obvious reasons. The first is that changing production modes may not be costless. In the present context, in all likelihood an outsourcing strategy is more costly than integrated production, possibly also including a fixed cost element. 19 Moreover, the change in production mode as such, whether from integrated production to outsourcing or the other way round, should be seen as a costly investment. Without entering any formal analysis, it is clear that this may support an equilibrium where the domestic wage rate is above or below w E , without any remaining incentive for a profit maximizing firm to reverse its strategy.
The second reason is that firms are unlikely to ignore the domestic wage effect of a change in their production modes. In the case of a single domestic firm, it seems natural that it should internalize this wage effect, ultimately leading to figure 2 above. However, assuming that such internalization disappears altogether once n > 1 is unconvincing.
Obviously, if n is "very large", the wage effect from an individual firm's action becomes negligibly small, which takes us back to the case considered by figure 1. But intermediate cases are less trivial and worth some further elaboration.
It is clear that the cooperative case leads us back to figure 2. As far as their outsourcing strategies are concerned, domestic firms then behave like the single firm considered above.
Suppose, therefore, that n > 1 and firms do not cooperate. Specifically, let us assume that each firm takes all other firms' outsourcing strategies as given and considers whether 19 I have taken up this line of reasoning in Kohler (2001) .
changing its own strategy increases its profits. The case is best understood as a twostage decision. In stage one, domestic firms decide on whether to rely on an integrated production of good 2 or to choose an outsourcing strategy. In the first case they invest their fragment B capital stock at home, while in the latter they invest it abroad. In stage two, those firms who have located their fragment B production at home will behave competitively on the domestic labor market according to the labor demand schedules
, while those who have adopted an outsourcing strategy will behave according to labor demand schedulesṼ
for foreign labor, respectively; see above. Obviously, the equilibrium domestic wage rate corresponding to these labor demands in stage two depends on how many firms have adopted an outsourcing strategy, as opposed to integrated production, in stage one. At the same time, a rational stage one decision requires an assumption about the wage rate that firms expect to prevail in stage two. An obvious case to look at is one where firms anticipate the equilibrium wage rate of stage two when making their stage one decisions. The resulting equilibrium may be called a sub-game perfect equilibrium of a non-cooperative outsourcing game, where stage two is a perfect competition equilibrium of the domestic labor market.
Characterizing this equilibrium is complicated by the fact that, although all firms are perfectly symmetric they do not adopt the same equilibrium strategies. A fraction ν will choose an outsourcing strategy, while the rest chooses integrated production. One way to characterize the equilibrium is to identify conditions under which, with a given ν and a corresponding domestic wage ratew(ν), both types of firms will face no incentive to revert their strategy. Obviously,w 0 < 0; the larger the share of firms adopting an outsourcing strategy, the lower the resulting equilibrium domestic wage rate. Suppose, then, that we are in a situation where the domestic wage rate is at somew, such thatw <w < w E , wherew is the equilibrium wage rate arising in the collusive case; see figure 2 above.
Notice that by considering a case wherew < w E , we effectively assume that condition 15 is met.
We first look at a firm presently choosing an outsourcing strategy and considering to revert to integrated domestic production because it observes a lower domestic wage rate (for an efficiency unit of labor). There are two cost effects to consider. First, fragment B will benefit from a lower wage rate. And secondly, since the firm expects to bid up the domestic wage rate, fragment A will be hit by higher cost. Writingŵ for the relative change in the domestic wage that this firm conjectures upon "moving back" , the expected change in the wage rate for fragment B, in relative terms, is (w/w E )(1+ŵ)−1. Linearizing the cost effect of a switch from outsourcing to domestic integration, an incentive for a return to integrated domestic production arises if
whereθ 1 j is the share of fragment j in good-1 unit-cost, andθ 1 jL is the labor share in the unit-cost of fragment j, respectively, under disintegrated production. This condition can be rewritten asŵ
A firm that runs a strategy of integrated domestic production and observes a higher foreign wage rate w E >w faces an incentive to change its strategy towards outsourcing only if its conjectured domestic wage effectŵ is such that
where the cost-shares relate to integrated domestic production. Notice thatŵ < 0, since outsourcing fragment B implies lower domestic labor demand. Condition 20 is equivalent
With common technologies, the difference between cost-shares of an outsourcing firm (in conditions 18 and 19) and those of an integrated firm (in conditions 20 and 21) are due only to the fact that the former faces a higher wage rate (w E >w) on fragment B. Moreover, the wage effect expected by a firm upon entering must be very close to that expected by a firm upon leaving with fragment B, i.e.,ŵ ≈ŵ. Hence, comparing the two conditions, it becomes apparent that if an outsourcing firm faces an incentive to move back, there will not at the same time be an incentive for an integrated firm to move fragment B offshore. It is clear thatw > w E will always imply an incentive for outsourcing. Hence, given condition 15 is satisfied as assumed above, equilibrium will featurew ≤ w E . Whether or not equality between w E andw will obtain in equilibrium depends on the conjectured wage effectŵ, to which I will turn below. Figure 3 depicts the cost-savings condition 19 as a line Γ ¡w /w E ¢ which is falling in w/w E , with a slope determined by the cost-shares. In the relevant range,w < w E , it is convex, and the intersection point with the horizontal axis is atw/w E = 1. Below this line, condition is 19 is satisfied.
To identify a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we must now turn to the conjectured wage effectŵ. This is determined by the various elasticities of labor demand along the schedules V 1 A (w, ·) and V 1 B (w, ·), describing behavior of integrated firms in sector 1, as well asṼ 1 A (w, w E , ·) which describes domestic labor demand by firms choosing an outsourcing strategy on fragment B. In additionṼ 1 B (w, w E , ·) serves to describe the immediate labor demand effect if a firm moves fragment B production back to the domestic economy, and V 2 (w, ·) determines labor demand in sector 2. The appendix shows that, assuming constant labor demand elasticities,ŵ may be approximated bŷ is defined as the firm's own labor demand on its outsourcing activity relative to domestic labor endowment, i.e.,γ
Equation 22 depicts the conjectured wage effect as a downward-sloping function of the wage ratio Ω(w/w E ). Again, in the relevant range,w < w E , it is convex. Figure 3 juxtaposes this line with the above cost-savings condition Γ ¡w /w E ¢ for a switch to integrated domestic production. The intersection point identifies the equilibrium we are looking for.
A crucial term to look at is |η| /γ 1 B . This can be interpreted as perceived elasticity of labor supply from the viewpoint of a representative outsourcing firm considering to revert to integrated domestic production. The lower this elasticity, the larger the conjectured wage effect, other things equal. A large elasticity value may cause the Ω-line to intersect the cost savings condition to the left ofw/w E , in which case ν * = 1, and the equilibrium is as in the single-firm case of figure 2. In other words, when identifying the equilibrium, we must treat the relevant Ω-line as vertical atw/w E . For a very high elasticity value, say due to a very low value ofγ 1 B , the equilibrium relative wagew * /w E may come close to the continuous case of figure 1.
I abstain from a detailed investigation of adjustment dynamics, but it is worth pointing out that a stability argument can be constructed comparing the slopes of the two lines in figure 3 . In the case depicted, if we are at a point where the conjectured wage effect w is below the line for the cost-savings condition, then the share of firms adopting an outsourcing strategy falls and domestic wage increases, sincew 0 (ν) < 0. We thus move to the right, towards an equilibrium position likew * /w E . If the Ω-line is steeper than the cost-savings-condition, then a movement initiated at a non-intersection point would lead us away from the equilibrium.
5 Issues of interpretation
Firm asymmetry and the adjustment process
If the non-cooperative outsourcing equilibrium just described features an interior intersection point wherew <w * < w E , then there is an important asymmetry. Firms engaged in outsourcing have lower profits (or capital rental) than firms choosing an integrated domestic production mode. From an empirical point of view, the coexistence of both strategies in a single industry as such is not unusual, but if anything intuition would perhaps lead us to expect an opposite profit asymmetry. However, within the present model the reason for higher profits of purely domestic firms is quite straightforward. All firms have a common technology, while integrated domestic firms enjoy a lower wage rate than outsourcing firms on fragment B of their respective value-added. From a theoretical perspective, this raises the question of why any firm should choose an outsourcing strategy in stage one, knowing that the equilibrium features a coexistence of both strategies, with higher profits for the strategy of integrated production. One can rely on at least two different interpretations of the equilibrium when trying to answer this question. The first is a probabilistic interpretation, as often suggested for equilibria where symmetric agents find different "treatments". Specifically, what the equilibrium condition determines is ν * , the share of outsourcing firms that corresponds to the intersection point of the Γ-and Ω-lines of figure 3. What cannot be determined, barring any asymmetry across firms, is whether a specific firm will end up as an integrated firm or an outsourcing firm. This can then be seen as the outcome of a draw.
A different, and presumably more satisfactory, way to deal with the above question is to allude to some form of dynamic adjustment process, starting from a situation where all firms are perfectly integrated, and where globalization leads to a fall in w E as assumed in the above scenario. For instance, one may assume that there is an asymmetry among firms, unrelated to their fundamental technology, which determines a well-specified sequencing of individual outsourcing decisions. Indeed any sequencing of decisions would do the trick, but simply relying on an arbitrary exogenous force determining the sequence in which otherwise completely symmetric firms may respond to a given outsourcing incentive comes very close to the previous probabilistic interpretation. Whatever the sequencing, each firm going abroad causes the domestic wage rate to fall, thus reducing the incentive that remains for other firms follow. Once a sufficient number of firms has left, the incentive remaining for the rest to follow will disappear. Of course, a perfectly analogous argument can be constructed from the other side, based on some sequencing of decisions to revert from an outsourcing strategy towards integrated production, as long as the cost-savings condition 19 is satisfied. It is clear that, given the discontinuity involved, the two adjustment processes will lead to equilibria where the number of firms choosing an outsourcing strategy differs by 1. In this sense, the equilibrium is not independent of the adjustment path. Indeed, it may even be the case that approaching the equilibrium "from above" leads tow * > w E , while approaching it "from below" leads tow * < w E .
Firm size and competitive reference equilibrium
A second issue of interpretation arises with respect to the welfare significance of the equilibrium wage gap w E −w * , as suggested by figure 2. That figure relies on a reference case where there is perfect competition on the domestic labor market. A crucial variable for the equilibrium depicted in figure 3 is the perceived labor supply elasticity |η| /γ 1 B . One may now wonder about the termγ 1 B . If that term is non-negligible, shouldn't a representative firm also have a non-negligible influence in the domestic labor market to start with? If so, the assumption of perfect competition on the domestic labor market, and thus a competitive reference equilibrium as assumed in figure 2, may seem questionable.
It is important to separate two distinct issues when responding to this question. The first is whether or not a low value ofγ 1 B will causew * to be close to w E , which would essentially rule out a negative "outsourcing surplus" of the type depicted in figure 2 . The second issue is more fundamental, questioning wether a competitive integrated equilibrium is an adequate reference point for a welfare evaluation of the outsourcing scenario. Notice that this is a fundamental assumption underlying figure 2. Both points are difficult to settle without further information on the industry in question. On the first point, the crucial parameter is notγ 
Market power on the domestic labor market
This is not to say, of course, that changing the modeling perspective where the initial integrated production equilibrium features imperfect competition on the domestic labor market is useless. A full-fledged analysis of a meaningful alternative case is beyond the scope of this paper, but a few quick observations are worth making. Based on the questions raised before, the most natural case to look at is one where domestic firms in industry 1 have monopsony power on the domestic labor market. The easiest case to envisage is a single domestic firm in industry 1. The marginal productivity schedule V 2 (w,K 2 ) then serves as a labor supply schedule for this firm. The integrated production equilibrium features a common markup of the marginal productivities in the two fragments of industry 1 over the wage rate w * which is, in turn, equal to the marginal productivity in industry 2. There is a distortion in that too little labor is employed in industry 1, and too much in industry 2.
A first observation is that, due to this distortion, outsourcing has a first-order welfare effect which was absent in the competitive case. It would appear at first sight that this first-order effect is negative since outsourcing fragment B of industry 1 will in all likelihood lead to a reallocation of domestic labor from industry 1 into industry 2. But a little reflection reveals that this intuition is misleading. The distortion initially present in fragment-B-employment is annihilated by outsourcing as such, and this involves inframarginal gains on employment of foreign labor which exceed the marginal product of labor in industry 2. Moreover, with outsourcing as the driving element labor set free to move into industry 2, industry 2, additional industry-2 employment is not at the expense of industry 1 output. Instead, industry 2 expands simultaneously with employment in fragment A of industry 1, and with output in industry 1. Hence, the right intuition is that, with a flat effective foreign labor supply curve, international disintegration of production partly removes the anti-competitive distortion in the domestic labor and thus entails a positive additional first-order welfare effect. The likelihood of a negative net welfare effect from fragmentation, as indicated by figure 2 above, is therefore reduced if the underlying indivisibility implies that the reference equilibrium involves monopsony power on the domestic labor market.
A further point is that an incentive for disintegration of production may arise even if w E is above the domestic equilibrium wage rate. The relevant comparison is between w E and the marginal cost of labor for integrated domestic production which is above the domestic wage rate. And w E may well be below the marginal cost of domestic labor, even if it is above the domestic wage rate. The wedge between the domestic wage rate and the marginal cost of domestic labor also makes a crucial difference as regards the domestic wage effect from disintegration. Prior to disintegration, the marginal productivity of labor in industry 1 is equal in both fragments, and equal to the marginal cost of labor. The marginal cost of labor, in turn, is above the wage rate because any increase in labor demand leads to a wage increase which affects the cost of infra-marginal labor on both fragments. If fragment B is now obtained from abroad, this will have a direct effect on the marginal cost of labor in industry 1, since a wage increase now affects inframarginal employment of fragment A only. Specifically, even at an unchanged domestic wage rate, the marginal cost of domestic labor for the firm in industry 1 falls due to disintegration, an effect which is missing in the competitive case. This effect, in and of itself, is expansionary on the firm's labor demand, and it is an indication that the wage depression effect of outsourcing is less pronounced if the outsourcing firm has monopsony power on the domestic labor market.
Conclusions
In concluding, I should like to get back to the question of adjusting to globalization. In this paper, the policy challenge from globalization in some sense arises in a pretty narrow way.
Somewhat paradoxically, one may even call it a regional policy challenge. The underlying assumption is that labor markets are sometimes pretty regional in nature, with a high degree of labor mobility between a relatively small number of industries within a small region, but with very low mobility across such regions, despite potentially sizable wage differences. This seems a reasonable assumption particularly in the European context.
Outsourcing then seems an interesting option for firms to arbitrage on wage differences.
In earlier times, "economic distance" has provided a certain degree of protection from "foreign" regions, but globalization means that in one way or another this distance shrinks, giving rise to incentives for regional disintegration of production. Policy makers then face the expectation to do something about this loss of natural protection, whence regions stand to lose entire fragments of their core value-added processes.
The purpose of this paper is to offer a framework of analysis which allows one to juxtapose the efficiency and distributional effects emanating from this specific form of globalization. The purpose was not to derive specific policy recommendations, but instead to identify specific questions that will almost always be important to ask, and to point out relevant criteria to employ towards policy formation. Although the paper has stopped way before suggesting specific policy measures, a number of important insights have emerged.
If outsourcing happens in a world of perfect markets, then the case for an active policy response is restricted to distributional policy objectives. There will almost always be redistribution effects which may run counter to the (implicit of explicit) distributional objective pursued in society. This is by no means new or special to outsourcing, nor is the economists' response. If a certain distributional effect is in conflict with a region's view of justice, then policy should do something about it, but it should not do so by interfering with fragmentation or outsourcing as such. It should rely on first-best lump-sum measures instead.
However, the precise direction of distributional effects of outsourcing is often difficult to identify. Looking at reality alone is potentially misleading if other determinants of factor prices change as well. The analysis of this paper seems to suggest that labor employed in the value-added chains lost to foreign regions will always lose, to the advantage of other factors. But one should warn against too far-reaching generalizations from this impression. Distributional effects are highly sensitive to specific modeling assumptions, and it is not too difficult to find examples, particularly where all factors are mobile, where the effects are contrary to what has transpired as a seemingly robust result from the present analysis. 20 However, from a policy perspective this problem seems like a nonissue, at least if the precise cause of an unwelcome change in income distribution does not matter for its desirability. If it is deemed undesirable it should be corrected, whatever its cause. But again, this should be done in a distortion-free, first-best manner.
As to the efficiency effect of international fragmentation, the crucial question emphasized by the above analysis is whether or not the resources set free through outsourcing will find alternative employment where they generate value-added which is comparable in size to what they have earned before. As a reference case, the paper deals with a friendly environment where markets are perfect. The general message emerging in this regard, often inadequately acknowledged in policy-oriented discussions about international outsourcing and fragmentation, is that one should look at what outsourcing implies for the activities that remain in the domestic region, and not so much at the specific characteristics of the value-added fragments lost. In the likely case where there are sector-specific factors, these activities generate enough additional value-added for disintegration to cause a welfare gain in the region losing a fragment of its domestic value-added through outsourcing, provided such outsourcing does not involve any non-convexity in technology. As 20 See Kohler (2002) where I discuss the literature and look at distributional effects from a general perspective.
often in globalization scenarios, this welfare gain is coupled with a redistribution effect. If outsourcing takes place foreign direct investment, then redistribution is to the disadvantage of domestic labor. The story is reminiscent of the well-known "immigration surplus", but the crucial difference is that the relationship between the "outsourcing surplus" and redistribution is the opposite of the usual story: The larger the gain, the lower the pain of redistribution.
As always, the policy challenge gets more involved if markets for some reason or other are subject to imperfections. An imperfection which is often present in outsourcing relates to elements of non-convex technology. These may, in turn, be responsible for the fact that single firms hardly ever maintain any domestic production of a certain value-added slice, once they take the option of procuring it via outsourcing. Assuming that the fragment which leaves the region through outsourcing is subject to a fixed capital input, it can be shown that the resources set free through outsourcing may not generate sufficient valueadded in their alternative use, even under otherwise optimal factor market institutions, for fragmentation to be welfare enhancing.
The analysis has revealed a relatively straightforward necessary condition for such a welfare loss from outsourcing: The resulting domestic wage rate must be lower, corrected for efficiency differences and costs of international fragmentation, than the wage rate in the region which receives the formerly domestic fragment of value-added. This should be a criterion which is, in principle, amenable to empirical application. But it is only necessary, and not sufficient for a welfare loss. Hence it does not justify active policy.
But even if conditions are such that the "outsourcing-surplus" is negative, it is by no means trivially clear what the optimal policy response should be. This is a question which I have left unattended in the paper, and which warrants separate analysis. Moreover, as I have just mentioned, the analysis establishing the possibility of a negative "surplus" rests on the assumption that market are otherwise functioning perfectly, except for the indivisibility in outsourcing technology. Even if some further analysis should tell us what the optimal policy reaction would be in this case, that same policy almost certainly is no longer optimal, and may indeed be detrimental, under less well-functioning markets.
This is a straightforward point from the theory of the second-best, and it would seem particularly relevant for the labor market which are a prime candidate for a less optimistic modeling assumption. 
